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ABSTRACT

This study uses natural data, primarily, to study patterns of news coverage of the United States Senate in major media of regional and national stature. The following questions are addressed: To what extent do institutional and structural aspects of the Senate (seniority, committee assignment, and senatorial staff size) affect the news potential of individual senators? Do institutional factors create greater opportunity for some senators to gain publicity? Do journalists merely seek out active senators, without regarding the question of institutional position? Four major institutional and structural variables are investigated in activities of the eighty-ninth, the ninety-first, and ninety-third congresses: seniority, state size, committee leadership prestige, and personal staff size. Analysis of media exposure reveals that, while the predictive power of the institutional factor shifts from Congress to Congress, position in the Senate opportunity structure can provide a base from which to attract national media attention. (KS)

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PATTERNS OF SENATORIAL NEWS COVERAGE IN THE U.S.

by

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(Fall 1977)

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

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As a result of the dramatic growth in the power of the executive branch in the American political system during the last several decades, much concern has been voiced about the communication problems of the legislative branch. Many legislators and other analysts see press coverage of Congress as "occasional, haphazard, and unbalanced."[1] They argue that such unsystematic public information -- in contrast to more direct and thorough media concentration on the executive branch -- contributes to widespread ignorance about the workings of Congress and to sagging credibility in the eyes of constituents.[2]

These problems of communication were among the major concerns of the recent U.S. Commission on the Operation of the Senate. A major recommendation of the Commission was that the U.S. Senate should organize its public communication into a central staff responsibility, coordinating the information efforts of senators and committees working on priority issues, arranging news conferences regularly, and establishing a press briefing room under Senate control.[3]

In contrast, some scholars see the Senate as having taken much greater advantage of mass media coverage than has the House of Representatives or the judicial branch. Polsby argues that the development of extensive national press coverage in recent decades appears to have had a profound effect on the Senate. He says the national media, in part, permit a new breed of

senators to build a national constituency, contributing greatly to a decentralized power structure in the Senate.[4] Robinson finds that network television covers the Senate much more frequently than it reports House activity, conferring both stature and Presidential potential on Senators.[5]

Blanchard's study of Congressional correspondents found reporters agreeing that the Senate was given greater press attention than the House. Concluding that media preoccupation with the Senate was not necessarily undesirable, Blanchard[6] agreed with Polsby that the patterns of national press coverage of the Senate are consistent with the emergence of the Senate as a "great forum, an echo chamber, a publicity machine."[7] Polsby sees the Senate-press relationship as functioning to incubate policy innovations through "great debates" and the "hidden hand of self-promotion" of individual senators.[8]

These arguments point to the need for a firmer idea of the actual patterns of Senate news coverage. What factors determine which senators are visible and which suffer relative media obscurity?

The present research uses natural data, primarily, to study patterns of Senate news in major media of regional and national stature. The central questions guiding the work are these: To what extent do the institutional-structual aspects of the Senate -- such as seniority, committee assignment, and senatorial staff size -- affect the news potential of individual senators? Do institutional factors create an opportunity struc-

ture from which certain senators may gain greater publicity for their activities than their less fortunate colleagues? Or, do journalists, as they often claim, merely seek out those senators who are active or who have something important to say, without regard to their institutional position within the Senate?

Theoretical Background

Much of the classic work on Congress, especially Matthews' widely quoted research on the Senate,[9] emphasized the formal and informal institutional aspects of the federal legislature -- seniority, committee structure, norms, and folkways -- in explaining legislative organization and behavior. The more recent work on Congress places a much greater emphasis upon the conscious, goal-directed strategies of individual Congressmen, and less upon behavior which is in some way shaped by unwritten norms, role expectations, or institutionalized behavior patterns. Polsby, for example, argues forcefully that the evidence of an inner-club of a conformist, powerful controlling group of senators is slim, and that power is much more diffuse than an inner club argument would suggest. At least, he says, the negative powers to stall, amend, alter, or block legislation are widely dispersed, and that Senate division of labor tends to be ad hoc. Senators are just as likely to assume roles that fit their individual self-interests as to accept roles dictated by institutional forces beyond their control.[10]

Other analyses of power in the Senate seem to support Polsby's view. Ripley found Senate power to be diffuse, with individual senators having substantial bargaining leverage relative to party leaders.[11] Rieselbach also argues that Congress is decentralized, with power shared widely, but existing in "multiple centers of influence" not equally accessible to all senators.[12]

To what extent is the dispersion of authority in the Senate reflected in the mass media? Is press coverage dominated by the Senate shift toward decentralization of power -- with individual senators cultivating a national constituency for "independent advocacy" through media publicity[13] -- or do institutional-structural factors of Senate organization prevail in Senate news?

The norms, values, and constraints on the roughly 300 journalists regularly reporting on Congress[14] obviously have some effect on Senate news, but how much? Some scholars, such as Breed and Matejko, assume a group normative view of news work. They argue that the news is primarily a product of normative constraints emerging from within journalistic organizations.[15] Others see external institutions as the major influencers of news.

Hall[16], Epstein[17], Molotch and Lester[18], and Schiller[19] argue that news is manipulated by political and economic forces external to the media. They see journalistic norms as inferences about society which are couched in a political consensus managed

by institutions outside journalism. Epstein[20], for example, argues that journalists must rely heavily on outside institutions and experts for evaluation of "truth" because they are so poorly equipped to validate what is news themselves. Sigal's study of Washington news tends to support Epstein's view.[21]

In their review of the research on news structure, Davison, Boylan, and Yu[22] conclude that both forces from the external social-political environment and from within journalistic institutions shape the news. Galtung and Ruge[23] found that issues involving powerful elites were important in the initial news selection stages but that an event also had to be timely and contain news values of conflict, violence, or negativity to become and remain news.[24]

Reporters who spend most of their time in Congress appear to see their role as adversarial. A majority of those responding to Robert Blanchard's mail survey agreed that they were "watchdogs" against wrongdoing, determiners of the "veracity" of legislators' public utterances, prodders through their writing to get Congressmen to serve the public interest, and stimulants to "stir things up by asking questions."[25]

Few would doubt that the Congressional reporters' perceived role is valid some of the time, especially in the post-Watergate investigative mentality of much of the press.[26] But some research suggests the reporters' view of themselves is hardly the full story.

Miller's dissertation research on reporters in Congress --

consisting of extensive interviews with reporters, legislators, and committee and personal legislative staffs -- suggests they are just as often collaborators in the news as they are adversaries. In accepting and providing tips and leads, in willingness to float "trail balloons" and accept leaks, and in various arrangements of quid pro quo, reporters and Congressmen are often tacit, if not intentional, partners in the news.[27]

Matthews' earlier work on the Senate suggested much the same thing. He found reporters and senators engaged in an open exchange: "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours."[28]

Beneath this layer of an exchange relationship, however, Matthews saw other forces at work in determining Senate news, primarily institutional ones. He suggested that seniority, committee assignment, size of state represented, ideology, security of Senate seat, as well as senatorial activity were related to a senator's contact with reporters and subsequent news coverage.[29]

Some of our earlier work in content analysis of Senate news in the major news magazines, some major newspapers, and a set of elite, specialized media, attempted to develop and test hypotheses based on the institutional factors Matthews and others suggested.[30] As we extended our work to a longitudinal study of the 89th, 91st, and 93rd Congresses -- looking at the visibility of individual senators in the various media -- these findings emerged:

1. Of the various institutional variables looked at, only number of committee and subcommittee chairmanships, personal staff

size, and seniority appeared to have a substantial effect on senatorial visibility in more than one Congress;

2. Each Congress as well as the two political parties appeared to have different patterns of media visibility; and

3. The patterns of senatorial visibility of the mass media appeared fairly similar to the more specialized, elite journals, indexed in the Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS).

With this work as background, the present research extends the study of the 89th, 91st, and 93rd Congresses by refining the institutional factors into a single dimension, institutional opportunity structure, by attempting to look more closely at individual senators' activity as a factor in visibility, and by adding a major media source, the Associated Press national trunk wire.

The Hypotheses

Four major institutional-structural variables which emerged in our earlier studies as being related to senatorial visibility are used here. Multiple regression and path analysis are used to look at the individual effects of the factors, but the major thrust of the analysis is to assess their combined effects in an analysis of variance model, with senatorial activity used as the second independent variable.

Opportunity Structure

Seniority, size of state represented, personal staff size, and committee leadership prestige are combined into a single dimension, institutional opportunity structure.

1) Seniority. Technical changes in the seniority system of selecting committee chairmen in Congress which were made in 1971 and again in 1973 apparently have not effectively altered the importance of seniority in the Senate, at least not for the time period under study here.[31] The importance of seniority to the institutional power structure of the Senate is still considerable. Matthews suggested that senior senators had more frequent contact with national news reporters than their lower seniority colleagues, and our earlier study found some support for a relationship between seniority and visibility.[32]

2) State size. Senators from larger, more urban states appear to be more active in Senate proceedings than their colleagues from smaller states.[33] In addition, some reporters argue that big state senators see the media, even the national press, as an essential link with their large constituencies, especially for reelection purposes.[34] Our earlier study found state size to be an important factor in Senate media visibility.

3) Committee Leadership Prestige. Committee and subcommittee chairmanships and ranking minority memberships are positions of institutional power in the Senate that are openly sought after by all senators.[35] And, some reporters argue that committees are the fulcrum of press contact with Congress.[36] Our earlier studies suggested that number of committee and subcommittee chairmanships was related to media visibility.

In addition, certain committees are more desirable and powerful than others. Political scientists have established

several rankings of committee desirability.[37] While our earlier studies found no relationship between media visibility and prestige of committee assignment, we reasoned that combining committee desirability with the committee chairmanships variable might increase the power of committee leadership positions as predictors of media visibility.

4) Senate personal staff size. Personal staffs are important in helping a senator serve the direct needs of constituents, in researching and writing proposed legislation, and in dealing with the press. The hundreds of press releases which flood the Senate Press Gallery each day are usually the result of staff work. About half the senators have someone on their staffs designated as a "press aide," often a former journalist.

The larger the state represented, the bigger the clerk-hire budget of that senatorial office. The budget for the largest state, however, is only about three times larger than for the smallest state. Ripley argues that the pressures are so much greater on the large-state senators, that smaller state staffs may actually have more time to spend on legislative matters than the staffs of senators from bigger states.[38]

Staff quality, obviously difficult to measure, is likely to be a key factor in the performance of senators. Size of staff may also be important, especially in such things as churning out press releases and handling the mechanical aspects of publicity.[39] Our previous work found staff size to be an important predictor of media visibility.

These factors are combined in this study to produce a measure of institutional opportunity structure for each senator. It was hypothesized: Senators with a higher institutional opportunity structure are likely to be more visible in the mass media than are their colleagues who are lower in institutional opportunity.

Senate activity. Events and activity are obvious foci in news coverage of the Senate. A great deal of contemporary research suggests that activity may be a far more important predictor of press coverage in the contemporary Senate than are institutional factors. Herbert B. Asher, for example, has found that the norm of apprenticeship has begun to break down in both the House and the Senate, creating an atmosphere supportive of newcomer activity and participation.[40]

Activity in the Senate may be a wide variety of types, but committee work is generally considered to be most significant in terms of legislative productivity. Polsby suggests actual floor activity, especially introduction of bills, may be more important in the work of the Senate than is generally realized. He says submission of bills which are "going nowhere for the moment," combined with speeches on the floor and Senate hearings, function to make the Senate a "hothouse" for policy innovation.[41]

Other significant work, especially for senators attempting to build a national constituency for a specialized policy area, consists of activity outside the Senate, making speeches and

acquiring and giving information in other forms.

This leads to two hypotheses about activity:

(1) Senators who are higher in Senate floor activity -- bills introduced -- are likely to have greater visibility in the mass media than their less active colleagues.

(2) Senators who are higher in general senatorial activity -- speeches on and off the floor, as well as other external activity -- are likely to have greater visibility in the mass media than are their less active colleagues.

Methodology

Predominately natural, unobtrusive data from published documents -- Congressional Quarterly, Congressional Staff Directories, and Congressional Record -- and the mass media are used in this longitudinal content analysis of press coverage of the 89th, 91st, and 93rd Congresses. Seven personal interviews with Congressional correspondents -- three with Associated Press reporters in the Senate Press Gallery, two with United Press International reporters, and two with reporters who cover the Senate for the Knight-Ridder chain of newspapers -- provided supplementary descriptive data.

Independent Variables.

Opportunity Structure. Seniority rankings, state population size rankings, number of committee and subcommittee chairmanships (and ranking minority memberships), committee prestige rankings, and number of persons on a senator's personal staff were obtained

from standard documents.[42] The respective scores for each factor were summed, producing an index of institutional opportunity.

This procedure was based on the face validity of these measures, rather than on the empirical correlations among them. An examination of the empirical correlations indicates that state size and staff size correlate strongly (.66 and above for each Congress), and seniority and committee leadership prestige also are highly correlated (.63 and above for each Congress), but these two clusters tend to be weakly correlated in a negative fashion with each other. It can be argued, though, that these clusters are separate dimensions (external and internal) of institutional opportunity structure and therefore need not be correlated with each other to be added together.

Senatorial Activity. Two measures of activity are used, neither of which is presumed to be completely valid. Both, however, are relatively unobtrusive, and they have been used by others as an approximation of a kind of senatorial activity.

Number of bills introduced in each Congress by each senator was obtained from standard documents.[43]

The second measure is number of entries in the Congressional Record for each senator in each Congress. Asher has suggested that the Record can be used as a "sophisticated" measure of some types of legislative activity.[44] Our intent was to attempt a measure that would extend beyond legislative work to outside activity, such as speeches and public activity of various kinds. The Record appears to do that well. We are aware that individual Congressmen do alter the Record and that they sometimes may

use it cosmetically, It would appear, however, that manipulation of the Record is a practice that is common, rather than a characteristic of a particular type of senator.

Extensive review of the Congressional Record for a large group of senators from both parties strongly suggests that "irrelevant" entries, such as magazine and newspaper article titles cited but not authored by the senators, are proportional to the total number of entries. That is, a senator with a large number of total Record entries is also likely to have a large number of irrelevant entries. A senator with few Record entries has proportionally few irrelevant entries. Therefore, we decided to use the total number of entries for each senator as a simple measure of "activity" for this initial research. (In future work, we will attempt to classify Record entries for more detailed measurement of such things as internal-external Senate activity.)

Dependent Variable.

Media Index Visibility - Four major universes of media content data and two random samples of news stories are used at various points in time as a measure of press visibility of individual senators. For each Congress, all senators are ranked according to the number of news stories in which they appeared in the various media.

The mass media index used here contains magazine, newspaper, and Associated Press national wire stories. For the 93rd Congress, the nightly television newscasts for the ABC, CBS, and NBC networks are added to the printed sources in the index.

The names of the U.S. senators are used as coding units, both in the news items coded first-hand and in the major indexes used as secondary sources of visibility data. For each item in which a senator's name appeared, a single score was assigned regardless of multiple references. For the indexes used, each article or story on which a senator s name had been indexed in a particular volume received a score.

The complete universe of articles mentioning U.S. senators in 250 popular periodicals -- ranging from Newsweek to Reader's Digest -- are coded for all three Congresses. The Newspaper Index of articles from the Washington Post, New Orleans Times Picayune, Chicago Tribune, and the Los Angeles Times and the Television Index of network newscasts are coded for the 93rd Congress.

University Microfilm's daily file of the Associated Press national trunk wire -- the major source of Senate news for most American daily newspapers -- was searched for all three Congresses.

In addition to these standard sources of visibility data, several random samples of news coverage were used for the 89th Congress from four Western and six Eastern prestige newspapers and the three major news magazines.[45] (See Figure 1.)

The diverse media sources used here provide a reasonably complete and representative index of media of regional and national stature. The major newspapers coded, the networks, and some of the magazines, maintain their own correspondents

in the Capitol. By including the wire service, the index contains the basic pool of Senate stories from which many other media, especially small daily newspapers, draw their news about Congress.

Procedures used by the standard indexes included in this research assured that only substantive material about U.S. senators would be coded. No attempt has been made to classify the visibility references into news categories, but an examination of a sample of the references from the index suggested that most of the mentions are of a substantive nature.

The three major news magazines were coded by hand for the 89th Congress and the results were compared to those for the Reader's Guide. A Pearson's r of .91 was obtained. Reasonably high intercorrelations of the visibility rankings for the separate media appeared to justify pooling of the visibility data into a mass media index. (See Tables 1, 2, and 3.)

Level of measurement approached interval scales for both independent and dependent variables in the study. Multiple regression, path analysis[46] and analysis of variance are used with the data.

Findings

During the decade of Democratic Congresses from 1965 to 1974, the smallest Republican minority since 1937 struggled from 32 senators in the 89th Congress -- the first year of the Johnson Administration -- to 41 members in the 93rd Congress, which opened on the heels of the Nixon landslide election.

Republican press coverage, however, failed to keep pace with their gain in numbers. Senate Republicans got 33 percent of the mass media coverage in the 89th Congress, dropped considerably in the 91st, and received only 32 percent of the Senate news in the 93rd Congress. By the time Watergate began to emerge as a serious issue, the average Democratic senator was getting substantially more news play than his Republican colleague.

At the same time Republicans were becoming comparatively less visible in Senate media coverage, the equality of coverage among Republicans was less than among Democrats in the 93rd Congress. In other words, the disparity of coverage among Republicans was somewhat greater than among Democrats. (This is shown by a kurtosis of 1.43 for Republican mass media visibility as compared to a kurtosis of 4.5 for Democrats.)

The Republican shift toward greater intraparty news inequality followed the overall pattern for the Senate during the decade studied here. At a time when political scientists observe a move toward individualization of power, or a decentralization of power, in the Senate, news coverage of the Senate appears to have become increasingly unequal. The shift appears to have occurred between the 91st and the 93rd Congresses, and rather abruptly.

As we shall demonstrate in detail later, the change toward Senate news inequality appears to be partially explained by the emergence of institutional opportunity structure as a much more powerful predictor of news visibility in the 93rd Congress than

it had been in the 89th or 91st Congresses. By the 93rd Congress, the data suggest that opportunity structure and both measures of activity, along with an interaction between opportunity and record activity, are stronger predictors of senatorial visibility than at the previous points in time.

It is tempting to think in terms of trends of coverage over the three Congresses, but that would be misleading. What we appear to have are shifts in coverage patterns, not a trend. Among the various media included in the mass media visibility index, the visibility rankings of senators remained fairly constant within each Congress. Pearson correlations, in general, were all well above .50 among the various media. For example, the four major newspapers in the Newspaper Index were in near perfect agreement with the evening network news broadcasts on the visibility rankings of senators for the 93rd Congress. (See Tables 1, 2, and 3.)

Tables 1,2,3 & 4 About Here

On the other hand, a comparison of the three Congresses suggests they were covered differently. That is, the correlations of overall mass media coverage among the three Congresses were weak to moderate, suggesting that each Congress was covered somewhat differently by the media. (See Table 4.)

89th Congress: 1965-66

At the height of his success in getting Great Society legislation, President Lyndon B. Johnson predicted that historians

would judge the 89th Congress as the best in U.S. history. Landmark social legislation -- medical care for the aged, voting rights, immigration reform, a broad housing subsidy for low income families, and Appalachian region development -- led some observers to compare the 89th Congress to the first two years of Roosevelt's New Deal. Escalating involvement in the Vietnam War and growing inflation captured much attention during the second session, but additional Great Society legislation was passed.[47]

Structurally, the 89th Congress appeared to be relatively stable. Little or no change occurred in the actual organization and operation of the House or Senate.[48]

The top newsmakers in the mass media for the 89th Congress were Robert Kennedy, Everett Dirksen (minority leader), Mike Mansfield (majority leader), Jacob Javits, J. William Fulbright, and Edward Kennedy, a predominately Democratic field. (See Figure 2.) In addition some fairly clear party differences emerged in the patterns of coverage for this Congress.

Figure 2 About Here

State size operating through size of personal senatorial staff was important in the visibility of senators of both parties, but it was more important for Republicans than for Democrats. (See Figure 5.) State size had a moderate, direct effect on Democratic visibility, just the reverse of the direct, negative effect on Republican news coverage. (These conclusions and those

that follow are based on both the standardized regression coefficients (Betas) and the unstandardized coefficients (b's), although only the Betas are presented in Figures 5-7.)

Figure 5 About Here

Seniority worked through committee leadership prestige to produce a moderately strong effect for Republicans, but the relationship was weaker for Democrats. No direct seniority effects were evident for either party.

Looking at the Senate overall, state size, which had only a slight direct effect, worked through personal staff size to produce a fairly strong impact on visibility in the 89th Congress. Seniority had no direct effect, but it appeared to operate through committee leadership prestige to be a weak predictor of visibility. (See Figure 5.)

Analysis of variance treatment of opportunity structure and the two measures of activity discloses an interaction effect. (See Tables 5 & 6.) A fairly clear interaction exists between both bills introduced and opportunity structure, and between Record activity and opportunity structure in their impact on Senate visibility in the 89th Congress.

Tables 5&6 About Here

91st Congress: 1969-70

The Democratic majority was substantially smaller in the 91st Congress than in the two previous Congresses, but with a Republican President legislative output during the first session was the lowest in 36 years. The intense Congressional debate about Vietnam subsided, and a compromise was reached on interim funding of the supersonic transport plane. A tax reform measure, extension of voting rights in national elections to 18-year-olds, and the establishment of major new federal agencies -- such as the Environmental Protection Agency -- were the major domestic actions of the 91st Congress.[49]

For the first time since World War II, the Senate attempted to limit the President's authority in foreign policy and military involvement, and the Tonkin Gulf resolution was repealed.[50] President Richard M. Nixon was extremely critical of the 91st Congress, especially the Senate, saying it "had seemingly lost the capacity to decide and the will to act."[51]

The deaths of Everett Dirksen, Republican minority leader, and Robert Kennedy changed the list of most visible senators during the 91st Congress. Edward M. Kennedy, Edward Muskie, and Charles Goodell, a Republican freshman from New York, headed the list of newsmakers, closely followed by Eugene McCarthy, George McGovern and Mike Mansfield. (See Figure 3.)

Figure 3 About Here

Size of state represented, working through personal staff size, dropped somewhat but remained a factor in the visibility of both parties in the 91st Congress. State size as a direct factor reverses, disappearing as an influence for Democrats and changing from a negative predictor to a moderately strong positive factor for Republicans. Committee leadership prestige disappears as an influence on Republican visibility and weakens considerably for Democrats. Seniority remains negligible for both parties.

In the 91st Congress overall, only the state size-staff size predictor, which decreases substantially from the 89th, remains reasonably strong as an influence on Senate visibility.

Analysis of variance appears to confirm that Record activity is the major predictor of press coverage in the 91st Congress. Both measures of activity appear to have strong main effects. Opportunity structure drops out completely as an influence in this Congress, with the interaction effect of opportunity and the activity measures having disappeared. (See Tables 7&8.)

Tables 7&8 About Here

93rd Congress: 1972-73

Bitter disputes with the executive branch harkened by the 91st Congress were paled by the clashes with the President in the 93rd Congress, dominated by Watergate. Election campaign reform, passage over the President's veto of a limit to executive war powers, authorization of the Trans-Alaska pipeline, debate about how to deal with the energy shortage, and challenges to the seniority system and Congressional reorganization were soon to be swept from the front pages by the all-consuming crisis of Watergate.[52]

As chairman of the Senate Select Committee, North Carolina Senator Sam J. Ervin rose to the top of the list of most visible senators, along with defense policy critic Henry Jackson. Kennedy, Mansfield, McGovern, Javits, and Humphrey followed, suggesting the strong Democratic dominance of Senatorial press coverage in the 93rd Congress. (See Figure 4.)

State size again increased dramatically as a direct influence on Republican press coverage, with the relationship through staff size remaining weak for the G.O.P. in the 93rd Congress. For the Democrats, state size reemerges as a weak factor and staff size remains at about the same level as in the 91st. Committee leadership prestige becomes stronger for Democrats, emerging as a moderate factor, but becomes increasingly a negative factor for Republicans, having been strong in the 89th and slightly negative in the 91st. (See Figure 7)

For the first time, seniority appears as a positive influence on the visibility of both parties, stronger for Democrats than for Republicans.

Of the three Congresses studied here, the institutional-structural factors appear to be the strongest predictors of press coverage in the 93rd Congress. Seniority becomes much stronger, having moved from no effect in the 89th to a reasonably strong one in the 93rd. Committee leadership prestige reemerges as a powerful factor in this Congress, along with a strengthened direct influence of state size and a continued weakening of the effect of personal staff size. (See Figure 7.)

Figures 4&7 About Here

Record activity was a very strong positive factor for the 93rd Congress, and bills sponsored appeared to be positively related to visibility for those senators with a high level of opportunity structure.

Analysis of variance shows clearly that institutional opportunity structure emerged as a major factor in Senate

visibility in the 93rd Congress. Record activity, too, had a main effect on press coverage. (See Tables 9 & 10.)

Tables 9 & 10 About Here

Discussion

Clearly, the longitudinal data on Senate visibility gathered here suggest that the institutional opportunity structure and the activity hypotheses are supported, but the pattern of support is fairly complex. In the 89th Congress, opportunity structure and activity have an effect primarily through an interaction. Several years later, in the 91st Congress, opportunity structure essentially drops out, with the two measures of activity remaining as influences on visibility. At the height of the Watergate scandal, in the 93rd Congress, opportunity structure emerges as a fairly powerful factor in Senate media coverage. Both activity measures sustain their greater influence on visibility in all three Congresses.

In addition, these specific points emerged from the study.

1. Republicans, the minority party throughout the time period studied, declined in news coverage relative to the Democratic majority, even though the number of Republicans in the Senate increased. From relative parity of visibility in the 89th Congress, the G.O.P. dropped by the 93rd Congress to the point that the median Republican senator with 168 press mentions was far behind his Democratic colleague with 304.

2. Overall Senate and intra-party equality of individual press coverage dropped somewhat between the 91st and 93rd Congresses, with the Republicans experiencing significantly greater intra-party inequality than the Democrats.

3. The dramatic shift toward greater inequality of coverage occurred in the 93rd Congress, the period when institutional opportunity structure appeared to be at its strongest as a predictor of visibility. The seniority and committee leadership prestige factors of opportunity structure emerge fairly strongly in this period. The effect of that development is suggested quite vividly in the case of the Republicans. At a time when they are increasing their numbers (with a greater proportion of freshmen, of course) in the Senate, the resurgence of the institutional factors in the 93rd appears to have been associated with both the loss and greater comparative inequality of press coverage in the 93rd Congress.

4. Activity measures were more consistently predictive of press coverage than was opportunity structure. An interaction effect with opportunity structure in the 89th, clear main effects in the 91st, and strong main effects in the 93rd Congress demonstrate the importance of the activity measures.

5. The patterns of institutional opportunity and activity effects on press coverage appeared to be distinctly different for each party and for each Congress. But the patterns of press coverage were highly similar among the media for each Congress. Network television news, the wire service, major newspapers and magazines all responded in similar patterns to the factors studied here.

In an attempt to provide a wider perspective on press coverage of the Senate, personal interviews were conducted with seven prominent Washington Correspondents.[53] Four Associated Press reporters and two United Press International correspondents working out of the Senate Press Gallery, and two reporters for a large newspaper chain, described Senate coverage and reacted to some of the Senate visibility data. When shown a list of highly visible senators, the reporters explained the results in terms of many of the variables used in the study -- seniority, committee assignment, and activity -- but they added a host of individual differences and personality characteristics. Presidential aspirations, an understanding of the press, and expertise were often cited.

The same kinds of explanations emerged for low visibility senators, but these senators also evoked a range of other comments: "They don't want to make news;" "They're a bland, faceless lot;" "They're quiet or fearful of the press."

None of the reporters mentioned senatorial staffs in their initial explanations of Senate coverage, but when asked about it,

all agreed that staffs were a key factor in reporting the Senate. Phone calls from Senate staffers to reporters in the middle of our interviews -- reminding them of press conferences or providing other information -- seemed to support the reporters' statements. They said staffs were consulted by reporters far more frequently than senators themselves and that the more persons on the staff, the more areas a senator could specialize in.

Much more important than staff size was staff quality, the reporters felt. A strong staff could make the difference in legislative effectiveness and visibility. In addition, they reported that some senators were particularly adept at using committee staffs for personal aggrandizement.

Press releases were in evidence everywhere in the Senate Press Gallery. They were on bulletin boards, the reporters' cluttered desks, and in the hands of some.

All the correspondents agreed that the highly visible senators churned out reams of paper, but they insisted this alone did very little to affect coverage. They saw press release volume as a function of greater activity -- "aggressiveness" was a frequent term used. Rarely do press releases become news stories in themselves, according to the correspondents, but they were viewed as important for background, as explanations of bills, and as general reference matter. A UPI correspondent noted that a senator's floor activity was likelier to make news if he also issued a supplementary press release about it. A veteran AP reporter said, however, "It's

an inevitable fact of life, the way we operate with limited staff. . ., that the more speeches, press releases, and other activities a senator turns out, the more coverage we give him."

The reporters found plausible the relationship between state size and visibility. Senators from big states have more "clout" and often have presidential aspirations, they said. One of them noted that big-state senators approach the press differently from the small-state senators. He said big-state senators see the media as key to their reelection; they cannot possibly shake hands with everybody the way the small-state people can.

All the reporters interviewed saw staff quality, committee work, committee chairmanships, and what one of them termed "meaningful activity on issues" as major determinants of media coverage. A young UPI reporter said it was a simple matter of the "doers and the non-doers," adding, "I honestly don't know what some senators do here!"

In summary, this longitudinal study suggests that being high in Senate opportunity structure can, indeed, provide a base from which to attract national media exposure. The predictive power of the institutional factor apparently shifts from Congress to Congress, though, and the importance of senatorial activity in making the news appears to be greater than the institutional forces.

Only further longitudinal study of previous Congressional decades can begin to provide an answer, but this study suggests

that a decentralization of power in the Senate is not strongly reflected in the patterns of mass media coverage during the decade of the 89th to the 93rd Congresses. And, the disturbing shift to greater inequality of press coverage, both inter-party and intra-party, in the 93rd Congress suggests that the media may be contributing to what Jones has called the "centrifugal tendencies" of Congressional power.[54] Future research is needed on substantive changes in Senate news that may have accompanied the shift in quantitative patterns of coverage in the 93rd Congress.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Charles Bosley, "Senate Communications with the Public," in Commission on the Operation of the Senate, Senate Communications with the Public: A Compilation of Papers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 3. See also William I. Hill, "Congressmen Flunk Reporters on Coverage of 94th Congress," Editor and Publisher (December 18, 1976), p. 9, in which Hill reports that an overwhelming majority of congressmen agree that the press fails to report Congress adequately.

[2]For an excellent discussion of the diffuse, fluctuating citizen support for Congress, see Leroy N. Rieselbach, Congressional Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1973), pp. 221-224. Rieselbach concludes that public support for Congress "well within acceptable limits."

[3]Commission on the Operation of the Senate, Toward a Modern Senate: Final Report of the Commission on the Operation of the Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 65-73.

[4]Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), pp. 100-101.

[5]Michael J. Robinson, "A Twentieth-Century Medium in a Nineteenth-Century Legislature: The Effects of Television on the American Congress," in Norman J. Ornstein (ed.), Congress in Change: Evolution & Reform (New York, N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1975), p.254

[6]Robert O. Blanchard, "A Profile of Congressional Correspondents," in Commission on the Operation of the Senate, Senate Communications with the Public: A Compilation of Papers, p. 73.

[7]Senate Communications with the Public: A Compilation of Papers, p. 73.

[8]Nelson Polsby, "Congress, Publicity and Public Policy," in Robert O. Blanchard (ed.), Congress and the News Media (New York, N.Y.: Hastings House Publishers, 1974), pp. 131-134.

[9]Donald R. Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (Chapel: University of North Carolina Press, 1960). All page references are for the Vintage Books paperback edition.

[10]Congress and the Presidency, p. 92.

[11]Randall B. Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1969), p. 229.

[12] Congressional Politics, p. 163.

[13] Congress and the Presidency, p. 103.

[14] "A Profile of Congressional Correspondents," p. 64.

[15] Warren Breed, "Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis," Social Forces 33:326-335 (May 1955), and Aleksander Matejko, "Newspaper Staff as a Social System," in Jeremy Tunstall (ed.), Media Sociology (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1970), pp. 168-180.

[16] Stuart Hall, "A World at One with Itself," in Stanley Cohen and Jock Young (eds.), The Maufacture of News (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1973) pp. 85-94.

[17] Edward J. Epstein, "The American Press: Some Truths about Truths," in John C. Merrill (ed.), Ethics and the Press (New York: Hastings House, Publishers, 1975), pp. 60-68

[18] Harvey Molotch and Marilyn Lester, "Accidents, Scandals, and Routine News: Resources for Insurgent Methodology," in Gaye Tuchman (ed.), The TV Establishment: Programming for Power and Profit (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1974), pp. 53-65.

[19] Herbert I. Schiller, The Mind Managers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).

[20] "The American Press: Some Truths about Truths," pp. 60-68.

[21] Leon V. Sigel, Reporters and Officials (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co., 1973).

[22] Phillips W. Davison, James Boylan, and Frederick T.C. Yu, Mass Media: Systems and Effects (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp. 71-91.

[23] Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge, "The Structure of Foreign News," in Jeremy Tunstall (ed.), Media Sociology, pp. 259-298.

[24] Blumler, in a study of producers of BBC television election coverage, concluded that outside institutional or political pressures affected the determination of what was important far less than did their own personal criteria. See Jay G. Blumler, "Producers' Attitudes Towards Television Coverage of an Election Campaign: A Case Study," in Jeremy Tunstall (ed.), Media Sociology, pp. 411-438. Elliott, in a similar study of television documentary producers in England, also found that they relied more heavily on their own personal evaluations of content but noted that the producers also depended on outside authoritative scurces to define important information for them. For example, in designing a series on prejudice the TV producers utilized newspaper stories as well as associations representing people or causes related to the subject matter to tell them what was important or "true". See Philip Elliott, The Making of a Television Series (New York: Hastings House, Publishers, 1973).

[25]"A Profile of Congressional Correspondents," p. 71.

[26]Henry Fairlie, "Profit Without Honor," The New Republic (May 7, 1977), pp. 16-18.

[27]Susan Hielmann Miller, Congress and the News Media: Coverage, Collaboration and Agenda-Setting (Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Stanford University, 1976).

[28]U.S. Senators and Their World, p. 214.

[29]U.S. Senators and Their World, p. 215-217.

[30]David H. Weaver, G. Cleveland Wilhoit, Sharon Dunwoody, and Paul Hagner, "Senatorial News Coverage: Agenda-Setting for Mass and Elite Media in the U.S.," in Senate Communication with the Public: A Compilation of Papers, pp. 41-62.

[31]Norman J. Ornstein, "Seniority and Future Power in Congress," in Congress in Change: Evolution & Reform, p. 72.

[32]U.S. Senators and Their World, p. 200, and "Senatorial News Coverage. . .," pp. 45-50.

[33]U.S. Senators and Their World, p. 200.

[34]Interview with Joseph W. Hall, Jr., AP correspondent, in Senate Press Gallery, February 26, 1976.

[35]"Seniority and Future Power in Congress," pp. 72-83.

[36]Mary Russell, "The Press and the Committee System", The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, (Jan. 1974), 411:114-119.

[37]Rieselbach, Congressional Politics, p. 60.

[38]Power in the Senate, p. 214, fn. 6.

[39]Staff size, of course, is partly a function of state size, because the larger the state the larger the senator's allowance for staff. However, the senator may use the staff allowance for a few highly paid persons or for many low-paid ones.

[40]Herbert B. Asher, "The Changing Status of the Freshmen Representative," in Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform, p. 234.

[41]Congress and the Presidency, pp. 99-100.

[42]The term "opportunity structure" was suggested to us by Leroy Rieselbach, personal communication. Seniority rankings were obtained from Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1966, pp. 28-31, Congressional Directory, 1969, pp. 235-237, and Congressional Directory, 1973, pp. 241-243. Matthews (34, pp. 148-59) ranked committee desirability on an ordinal scale. His ranking ranges from 1 (Foreign Relations Committee) to 15 (District of Columbia Committee). The Aeronautics and Space Committee was created after Matthews' study and was assigned a rank of 4.5 upon his advice. The scale used here is highly correlated with a composite desirability ranking presented in Rieselbach, Congressional Politics, p. 60. We obtained a Spearman's Rho of .82 between the two scales. The number of committees and subcommittees a senator served on as chairman or ranking minority member was obtained from the Congressional Directory: 89th Congress, First Session and the Congressional Directory: 89th Congress, Second Session (14, pp. 289-95), and Congressional Staff Directory, 1969, pp. 141-160; 1970, pp. 169-186; 1973, pp. 185-206; 1974, pp. 185-206. The size of each senator's staff during the 89th Congress was determined by counting the number of persons listed for each senator in Charles B. Brownson, (ed.) Congressional Staff Directory (10, pp. 71-86) and the Report of the Secretary of the Senate, Jul. 1 - Dec. 31, 1969, pp. 23-75; Jul. 1 - Dec. 31, 1970, pp. 24-81. Jul. 1 - Dec. 31, 1973, pp. 30-92; Jul. 1 - Dec. 31, 1974, pp. 91-139. If a discrepancy existed in the number of persons from one Congressional year to the next, the larger number was used.

[43]Number of bills introduced by each senator was obtained from Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1966, pp. 1610-23, 1446-88; Congressional Index, (New York: Commerce Clearing House, Inc.), 1969, pp. 1001-1540; 1970, pp. 901-931; 1973-74, pp. 401-422, 551-790, 801-1351).

[44]"The Changing Status of the Freshman Representative," p. 238, fn. 21.

[45]Six "constructed months" (six first weeks, six second weeks, six third weeks and six fourth weeks) were drawn at random for each of the three news magazines (Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report) to obtain a sample of each magazine accounting for time and content variations in news flow. A total of 24 issues of each magazine was scanned from cover to cover for references to U.S. senators, with only advertisements and letters to the editor omitted. The four Eastern "prestige" newspapers (the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor, the New York Times and the Louisville Courier-Journal) were analyzed by Joseph W. Ward, "News Visibility of United States Senators in Four Prestige-Press Newspapers, "M.A. thesis, Indiana University, 1970. Ward included the four newspapers just mentioned because they were among 15 listed in "Nation's Editors Pick 15 'Superior' Papers," Editor and Publisher (April 12, 1960) p. 12. The editors were asked to list those American newspapers "most superior for news coverage, integrity and public service." The total sample for Ward's study consisted of issues of the four newspapers from eight "constructed weeks" (56 days or 224 issues) from the calendar year 1965). The six Western "prestige" newspapers (the Chicago Tribune, the Des Moines Register, the Kansas City Star, the Los Angeles Times, the Milwaukee Journal and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch) were analyzed by Mary Ann Wood, "Visibility of U.S. Senators in Six Western Prestige Newspapers," M.A. thesis, Indiana University, 1970. Like Ward, Wood included the six newspapers just mentioned because they were among 15 listed in the Editor and Publisher article on "superior" papers. The total sample for Wood's study consisted of issues of the six newspapers from eight "constructed weeks" (56 days or 336 issues) from the calendar year 1965. . Whereas the analysis of news magazine visibility, Reader's Guide visibility and Public Affairs visibility covered the entire 1965-1966 period of the 89th Congress, the Eastern and Western prestige press studies dealt only with the first half (1965) of the 89th Congressional session. The 89th Congress has been described as "slow moving," and with "little change, either politically, or organizationally," making it, in our view, a good bench mark for comparison of senatorial news coverage with the 91st and 93rd Congress. See Riddick and Zweben, footnote 53 below.

[46]For a general discussion of the theory, usefulness and dangers of causal analysis, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (New York: Norton Co., 1964). The following causal assumptions are asserted by the path model for the institutional variables. Recall these are assumptions about the direction of the causation. Questions involving magnitude and sign of effect are not directly related to the validity of these assumptions

a. The size of a Senator's state influences the size of his staff.

b. The size of the Senator's state influences the Senator's power position in the Senate.

c. Size of state has no causal effect on a Senator's seniority. (This will remain unanalyzed in the model.)

d. One's seniority influences the size of one's staff.

e. As one accumulates more seniority, committee and subcommittee assignments are affected.

f. The number of committee and subcommittee chairmanships a senator holds effects the size of his staff.

g. Size of state will produce differential effects on one's visibility.

h. Seniority will produce differential effects on one's visibility.

i. Staff size will produce differential effects on one's visibility.

j. The number of committee and subcommittee chairmanships a senator holds in the Senate will produce differential effects on one's visibility.

The most important assumption of this model is that the flow of causation is recursive. In addition to standardized regression coefficients (Betas), the unstandardized coefficients were examined when comparing one Congress to another, or when comparing Republican and Democratic senators to each other or to all senators in each Congress.

[47]Congressional Quarterly Almanac (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1965), p. 69.

[48]F.M. Riddick and Murray Zweben, "The Eighty-Ninth Congress: First Session," Western Political Quarterly, 19:354-357 (1966): and "The Eighty-Ninth Congress: Second Session," Western Political Quarterly 20:173-190 (1967).

[49]Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1969, p. 77.

[50]Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970, p. 73.

[51]Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970, p. 22.

[52]Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1973, pp. 2-5.

[53]Interviews conducted by Cleve Wilhoit, with Donald M. Rothberg, Joseph W. Hall, Jr., and Lawrence Knutson of the Associated Press Senate Bureau, and William Vance of the Knight News Service, Washington, D.C., February 26, 1976; and with Saul Friedman, National Press Building, October 21, 1976. Interviews conducted by Cleve Wilhoit and David Weaver with Donald May and Cheryl Arvidson of the United Press International Senate Bureau, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1976.

[54]Charles O. Jones, "Somebody Must Be Trusted: An Essay on Leadership of the U.S. Congress," in Ornstein (ed.), Congress in Change: Evolution & Change, p. 273.

FIGURE I

Media Sources Coded for the Visibility Measures
by the Three Congresses Studied

89th Congress 1965-1966	91st Congress 1970-1971	93rd Congress 1973-1974
Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature	Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature	Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature
Random Sample of Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report	Associated Press (National Trunk wire)	Newspaper Index to Washington Post New Orleans Times-Picayune, Chicago Tribune, and Los Angeles Times
Random Sample of issues from ten Eastern and Western Prestige Newspapers (Chicago Tribune, Des Moines Register, Kansas City Star, Los Angeles Times, Milwaukee Journal, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor, New York Times, and the Louisville Courier-Journal)		Television Index to ABC, NBC, and CBS nightly news.
Associated Press (National Trunk wire)		Associated Press (National Trunk wire)

FIGURE 2

Number of Appearances of Each Senator

in Mass Media

for the 89th Congress

Name	Appearances
Kennedy, R. F. (D-N.Y.)	917
Dirksen, E. (R-Ill.)	783
Mansfield, M. (D-Mont.)	541
Javits, J. K. (R-N.Y.)	400
Fulbright, J. (D-Ark.)	358
Byrd, R. C. (D-W.Va.)	343
Kennedy, E. M. (D-Mass.)	299
Morse, W. (D-Ore.)	283
Dodd, T. J. (D-Conn.)	238
Douglas, P. H. (D-Ill.)	229
Long, R. B. (D-La.)	174
Kuchel, T. H. (R-Calif.)	154
Russell, R. B. (D-Ga.)	132
McClellan, J. (D-Ark.)	129
Williams, J. J. (R-Del.)	126
Stennis, J. (D-Miss.)	124
Scott, H. (R-Pa.)	124
Bayh, B. (D-Ind.)	122
Cooper, J. S. (R-Ky.)	121
Miller, J. (R-Iowa)	119
Case, C. P. (R-N.J.)	117
Eastland, J. (D-Miss.)	115
Clark, J. S. (D-Pa.)	113
Tower, J. G. (R-Tex.)	111
Tydings, J. D. (D-Mo.)	111
Thurmond, S. (R-S.C.)	110
Hart, P. A. (D-Mich.)	108
Morton, T. B. (R-Ky.)	107
Murphy, G. (R-Calif.)	105
Ribicoff, A. (D-Conn.)	105
Aiken, G. D. (R-Vt.)	104
Proxmire, W. (D-Wis.)	102
Saltonstall, L. (R-Mass.)	101
Long, E. V. (D-Mo.)	99
Hickenlooper, B. (R-Iowa)	95
Curtis, C. T. (R-Neb.)	90
Ervin, S. (D-N.C.)	88
Symington, S. (D-Mo.)	86
McCarthy, E. J. (D-Minn.)	84
Monroney, A. S. (D-Okla.)	82
Nelson, G. (D-Wis.)	80
Anderson, C. (D-N.M.)	79
Hartke, V. (D-Ind.)	77
Sparkman, J. (D-Ala.)	77
Neuberger, M. (D-Ore.)	77
Lausche, F. J. (D-Ohio)	76
Pell, C. (D-R.I.)	74
Jordan, B. E. (D-N.C.)	72
Church, F. (D-Idaho)	71
Magnuson, W. G. (D-Wash.)	68
Ellender, A. (D-La.)	68
Gruening, E. (D-Alaska)	65
Yarborough, R. (D-Tex.)	65
Metcalf, L. (D-Mont.)	65
Mundt, K. E. (R-S.D.)	65
McGovern, G. (D-S.C.)	62
Hruska, R. L. (R-Neb.)	62
Randolph, J. (D-W.Va.)	62
Pearson, J. B. (R-Kan.)	62
Brewster, D. (D-Md.)	61
Smith, M. C. (R-Maine)	59
Prouty, W. L. (R-Vt.)	57
Mondale, W. F. (D-Minn.)	57
Pastore, J. O. (D-R.I.)	56
Hayden, C. (D-Ariz.)	53
Dominick, P. (R-Colo.)	51
Gore, A. (D-Tenn.)	51
Carlson, F. (R-Kan.)	50
Bennett, W. (R-Utah)	49
Fong, H. L. (R-Hawaii)	48
Young, S. M. (D-Ohio)	48
Bass, R. (D-Tenn.)	47
Muskie, E. S. (D-Maine)	47
Jackson, H. M. (D-Wash.)	46
Harris, F. (D-Okla.)	45
Smathers, G. A. (D-Fla.)	45
Bible, A. (D-Nev.)	44
Boggs, J. C. (R-Del.)	42
Bartlett, E. (D-Alaska)	41
Jordan, L. B. (R-Idaho)	41
McGee, G. W. (D-Wyo.)	40
Simpson, M. L. (R-Wyo.)	40
Holland, S. L. (D-Fla.)	39
Talmadge, H. E. (D-Ga.)	39
Williams, H. A. (D-N.J.)	38
McIntyre, T. J. (D-N.H.)	37
Moss, F. E. (D-Utah)	35
Allott, G. (R-Colo.)	34
Fannin, P. J. (R-Ariz.)	33
Inouye, D. K. (D-Hawaii)	32
Burdick, Q. (D-N.D.)	32
Young, M. R. (R-N.D.)	32
Hill, L. (D-Ala.)	31
Cannon, H. W. (D-Nev.)	28
Cotton, N. (R-N.H.)	28
Montoya, J. M. (D-N.M.)	18

FIGURE 3

Number of Appearances of Each Senator

in Mass Media

for the 91st Congress

Name	Appearances	Name	Appearances
Kennedy, E. (D-Mass)	291	Nelson, G. (D-Wisc.)	11
Muskie, E. (D-Maine)	164	Church, F. (D-Idaho)	11
Goodell, C. (R-N.Y.)	139	Smith, M.C. (R-Maine)	11
McCarthy, E. (D-Minn.)	117	Cranston, A. (D-Calif.)	11
McGovern, G. (D-S.D.)	94	Baker, H. (R-Tenn.)	11
Harris, F. (D-Okla.)	79	Percy, C. (R-Ill.)	11
Mansfield, M. (D-Mont.)	70	Saxbe, W. (R-Ohio)	11
Scott, H. (R-Pa.)	66	Gurney, E. (R-Fla.)	11
Tydings, J. (D-Md.)	53	Russell, R. (D-Ga.)	10
Hart, P. (D-Mich.)	53	Stevens, T. (R-Alaska)	10
Dodd, T. (D-Conn.)	51	Long, R. (D-La.)	9
Bayh, B. (D-Ind.)	49	Eastland, J. (D-Miss.)	9
Fulbright, J. W. (D-Ark.)	48	Cooper, J. S. (R-Ky.)	8
Goldwater, B. (R-Ariz.)	48	Allen, J. (D-Ala.)	8
Gore, A. (D-Tenn.)	45	Cook, M. (R-Ky.)	8
Hartke, V. (D-Ind.)	45	Mathias, C. (R-Md.)	7
Moss, F. (D-Utah)	39	Allot, G. (R-Colo.)	6
Yarborough, R. (D-Tex.)	37	Curtis, C. (R-Neb.)	6
Byrd, H. (D-Va.)	36	Hollings, E. (D-S.C.)	5
Hughes, H. (D-Iowa)	34	Magnuson, W. (D-Wash.)	5
Proxmire, W. (D-Wis.)	29	Pell, C. (D-R.I.)	5
Thurmond, S. (R-S.C.)	29	Case, C. (R-N.J.)	5
Williams, H. (D-N.J.)	27	Packwood, R. (R-Ore.)	4
Stennis, J. (D-Miss.)	26	Mundt, K. (R-S.D.)	4
Young, S. (D-Ohio)	26	Bible, A. (D-Nev.)	3
Javits, J. (R-N.Y.)	26	Metcalf, L. (D-Mont.)	3
Hruska, R. (R-Neb.)	25	Eagleton, T. (D-Mo.)	3
Jackson, H. (D-Wash.)	24	Hansen, C. (R-Wyo.)	2
Pastore, J. (D-R.I.)	24	Ellender, A. (D-La.)	2
Montoya, J. (D-N.M.)	24	Miller, J. (R-Iowa)	2
Hatfield, M.O. (R-Ore.)	22	Pearson, J. (R-Kan.)	2
Burdick, Q. (D-N.D.)	22	Randolph, J. (D-W.Va.)	2
Symington, S. (D-Mo.)	21	Spong, W. (D-Va.)	2
Ribicoff, A. (D-Conn.)	20	Aiken, G. (R-Vt.)	2
Ervin, S. (D-N.C.)	20	Anderson, C. (D-N.M.)	2
Holland, S. (D-Fla.)	20	Boggs, J. C. (R-Del.)	2
Griffin, R. (R-Mich.)	19	Dominick, P. (R-Colo.)	2
McGee, G. (D-Wyo.)	19	Young, M. (R-N.D.)	2
Prouty, W. (R-Vt.)	19	Bennett, W. (R-Utah)	2
Byrd, R. (D-W.Va.)	17	McIntyre, T. (D-N.H.)	1
Tower, J. (R-Tex.)	17	Bellmon, H. (R-Okla.)	1
Dole, R. (R-Kan.)	16	Gravel, M. (D-Alaska)	1
Brooke, E. (R-Mass.)	15	Talmadge, H. (D-Ga.)	1
Mondale, W. (D-Minn.)	15	Cotton, N. (R-N.H.)	0
Cannon, H. (D-Nev.)	15	Jordan, B. E. (D-N.C.)	0
Fannin, P. (R-Ariz.)	14	Jordan, L. (R-Idaho)	0
McClellan, J. (D-Ark.)	13	Schweiker, R. (R-Pa)	0
Fong, H. (R-Hawaii)	13	Sparkman, J. (D-Ala.)	0
Inouye, D. (D-Hawaii)	12		

FIGURE 4

Number of Appearances of Each Senator

in Mass Media

for the 93rd Congress

Name	Appearances	Name	Appearances
Ervin, S. (D-N.C.)	2,397	Allen, J. B. (D-Ala.)	228
Jackson, H. (D-Wash.)	2,154	Abourezk, J. (D-S.D.)	226
Kennedy, E. (D-Mass.)	2,028	Hatfield, M. O. (R-Ore.)	216
Mansfield, M. (D-Mont.)	1,505	Moss, F. (D-Utah)	203
McGovern, G. (D-S.D.)	1,348	Sparkman, J. (D-Ala.)	202
Javits, J. (R-N.Y.)	1,195	Brock, B. (R-Tenn.)	201
Humphrey, H. (D-Minn.)	1,141	Aiken, G. (R-Vt.)	192
Scott, H. (R-Pa.)	1,064	Schweiker, R. (R-Pa.)	185
Baker, H. (R-Tenn.)	1,049	Dominick, P. (R-Colo.)	183
Proxmire, W. (D-Wis.)	1,003	McGee, G. (D-Wyo.)	179
Muskie, E. (D-Maine)	994	Pastore, J. O. (D-R.I.)	172
Percy, C. (R-Ill.)	955	Thurmond, S. (R-S.C.)	170
Weicker, L. (R-Conn.)	890	Hruska, R. (R-Neb.)	168
Fulbright, J. W. (D-Ark.)	857	Scott, W. L. (R-Va.)	160
Goldwater, B. (R-Ariz.)	854	Helms, J. (R-N.C.)	159
Mondale, W. (D-Minn.)	702	Curtis, C. (R-Neb.)	155
Byrd, R. (Ind.-Va.)	618	McIntyre, T. (D-N.H.)	153
Stennis, J. (D-Miss.)	580	Byrd, H. (D-N.D.)	144
Long, R. (D-La.)	578	Cotton, N. (R-N.H.)	141
Buckley, J. (R-N.Y.)	574	Bellmon, H. (R-Okla.)	140
Gurney, E. (R-Fla.)	556	Beall, J. G. (R-Md.)	138
Stevenson, A. III (D-Ill.)	526	Packwood, R. (R-Ore.)	134
Cranston, A. (D-Calif.)	488	Taft, R. Jr. (R-Ohio)	131
Tunney, J. (D-Calif.)	488	Gravel, M. (D-Alaska)	130
Bayh, B. (D-Ind.)	442	Young, M. (R-N.D.)	128
Church, F. (D-Idaho)	415	Clark, D. (D-Iowa)	126
Tower, J. (R-Texas)	415	Bennett, W. (R-Utah)	126
Eagleton, T. (D-Mo.)	402	Johnston, J. B. (D-La.)	110
Talmadge, H. (D-Ga.)	395	Randolph, J. (D-W.Va.)	106
Mathias, C. (R-Md.)	382	Bartlett, D. (R-Okla.)	100
Ribicoff, A. (D-Conn.)	374	Fannin, P. (R-Ariz.)	99
Inouye, D. (D-Hawaii)	360	Hollings, E. (D-S.C.)	93
Williams, H. (D-N.J.)	356	Stevens, T. (R-Alaska)	89
Dole, R. (R-Kan.)	352	Biden, J. (D-Del.)	80
Hart, P. (D-Mich.)	348	Chiles, L. (D-Fla.)	73
Symington, S. (D-Mo.)	345	Metcalf, L. (D-Mont.)	73
Bentsen, L. (D-Tex.)	331	Hansen, C. (R-Wyo.)	72
Griffin, R. (R-Mich.)	331	Hathaway, W. (D-Maine)	72
Hughes, H. (D-Iowa)	329	Bible, A. (D-Nev.)	71
Brooke, E. (R-Mass.)	314	McClure, J. (R-Idaho)	67
Case, C. (R-N.J.)	310	Fong, H. (R-Hawaii)	66
Cannon, H. (D-Nev.)	305	Pearson, J. (R-Kan.)	65
Hartke, V. (D-Ind.)	304	Roth, W. (R-Del.)	52
Eastland, J. (D-Miss.)	296	Haskell, F. (D-Colo.)	51
Magnuson, W. (D-Wash.)	285	Domenici, P. (R-N.M.)	47
McClellan, J. (D-Ark.)	269	Nunn, S. (D-Ga.)	46
Nelson, G. (D-Wis.)	262	Huddleston, W. (D-Ky.)	44
Pell, C. (D-R.I.)	251	Burdick, O. (D-N.D.)	30
Montoya, J. (D-N.M.)	237	Stafford, R. (R-Vt.)	26
Cook, M. (R-Ky.)	229		

Figure 5: Path Models for Institutional Opportunity Factors and Senatorial Visibility for 89th Congress







Figure 6: Path Models for Institutional Opportunity Factors and Senatorial Visibility for the 91st Congress







Figure 7: Path Models for Institutional Opportunity Factors and Senatorial Visibility for 93rd Congress







TABLE 1

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG MEDIA VISIBILITY SCORES
FOR ALL SENATORS IN THE 89th CONGRESS (N = 96)

	Eastern Press	Western Press	News Magazines	Reader's Guide	Public Affairs	APE 89	APG 89
Eastern Press							
Western Press	.81						
News Magazines	.76	.84					
Reader's Guide	.65	.68	.91				
Public Affairs	.51	.58	.72	.74			
AP Elections	.59	.61	.78	.73	.55		
AP Govm't - Legislature	.69	.85	.76	.56	.54	.54	

TABLE 2

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG MEDIA VISIBILITY SCORES
FOR ALL SENATORS IN THE 93rd CONGRESS (N = 99)

	Readers Guide	News Magazines	Public Affairs	TV Index	Newspaper Index	AP Elections	AP Govm't	AP Waterga
Reader's Guide								
News Magazines	.70							
Public Affairs	.74	.61						
Television Index	.59	.78	.69					
Newspaper Index	.73	.77	.77	.91				
AP Elections	.73	.48	.71	.64	.70			
AP Govm't- Legislature	.59	.56	.65	.79	.84	.60		
AP Watergate Only	.34	.69	.50	.81	.65	.38	.38	

TABLE 3

INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG MEDIA VISIBILITY SCORES FOR ALL SENATORS IN THE 91st CONGRESS (N=97)

	Reader's Guide	News Magazines	Public Affairs	APE 91	APG 91
Reader's Guide					
News Magazines	.77				
Public Affairs	.76	.56			
AP Elections	.80	.62	.67		
AP Govm't - Legislature	.42	.39	.56	.49	

Table 4

Intercorrelations Among Mass Media Visibility Index Scores for the 89th, 91st, 93rd Congresses

	Visibility 89th	Visibility 91st	Visibility 93rd
Visibility 89th			
Visibility 91st	.32		
Visibility 93rd	.46	.55	

TABLE 5

Mean Press Visibility Scores for Senators in the 89th Congress, by Institutional Opportunity Structure by Activity Cited in Congressional Record

Opportunity Structure	Record Activity: Low	Record Activity: High	
Low	122 n=16	71 n=17	96
Mod	97 n=10	120 n=19	112
High	79 n=22	239 n=10	129
	97	128	112

Main effects F=.93, p=.43[a]
Opportunity Structure F=.79, p=.46
Record activity F=1.8, p=.19
2-way interaction F=4.7, p=.01

[a]The mass media index contained primarily complete universe data. Probability levels are presented for comparative purposes only.

TABLE 6

Mean Press Visibility Scores for Senators in the 89th Congress, by Institutional Opportunity Structure by Bills Introduced

Opportunity Structure	Bills Introduced: Low	Bills Introduced: High	
Low	56 n=13	122 n=20	96
Mod	138 n=14	87 n=15	112
High	95 n=21	194 n=11	129
	97	128	112

Main effects F=.92, p=.43
Opportunity structure F=.79, p=.46
Bills introduced F=1.8, p=.18
2-way interaction F=2.4, p=.097

TABLE 7

Mean Press Visibility Scores for Senators in the 91st Congress, by Institutional Opportunity Structure by Activity Cited in Congressional Record

Opportunity Structure	Record Activity: Low	Record Activity: High	
Low	9 n=18	31 n=14	19
Mod	9 n=16	43 n=17	27
High	12 n=15	42 n=17	28
	10	39	25

Main effects F=5.3, p=.002
Opportunity structure F=.33, p=.73
Record activity F=14.6, p=.001
2-way interaction F=.21, p=.81

TABLE 8

Mean Press Visibility Scores for Senators in the 91st Congress, by Institutional Opportunity Structure by Bills Introduced

Opportunity Structure	Bills Introduced: Low	Bills Introduced: High	
Low	17 n=18	21 n=14	19
Mod	11 n=14	39 n=19	27
High	16 n=15	40 n=17	28
	15	34	25

Main effects F=2.1, p=.10
Opportunity structure F=.35, p=.71
Bills introduced F=5.28, p=.02
2-way interaction F=.88, p=.42

TABLE 9

Mean Press Visibility Scores for Senators in the 93rd Congress, by Institutional Opportunity Structure by Activity Cited in Congressional Record

Opportunity Structure	Record Activity: Low	Record Activity: High	
Low	207 n=22	308 n=10	238
Mod	181 n=15	518 n=19	369
High	325 n=11	729 n=21	590
	226	565	399

Main effects F=7.6, p=.001
Opportunity structure F=3.1, p=.05
Record activity F=10.8, p=.001
2-way interaction F-1.05, p=.35

TABLE 10

Mean Press Visibility Scores for Senators in the 93rd Congress, by Institutional Opportunity Structure by Bills Introduced

Opportunity Structure	Bills Introduced: Low	Bills Introduced: High	
Low	236 n=20	243 n=12	238
Mod	381 n=14	360 n=20	369
High	398 n=15	759 n=17	590
	327	470	398

Main effects F=2.4, p=.07
Opportunity structure F=1.3, p=.285
Bills introduced F=4.5, p=.04
2-way interaction F=.89, p=.41